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Goebbels's Iowan:
Frederick W. Kaltenbach and
Nazi Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts
to America, 1939-1945
CLAYTON D . LAURIE
ON AN EARLY JUNE EVENING in 1940 the residents of
eastern Iowa heard a voice on their radios that sounded "mid-
westem," a voice indistinguishable from those they heard every
day at the local drugstore, tavern, or post office. Coming across
"as clear as a bell" from Nazi Germany, the voice was speaking
directly to them, to "friends in Dubuque and the midwest." In
a program called "Letters to Iowa," the broadcaster often ad-
dressed "Harry/' a childhood friend in Waverly, Iowa. "Dear
Harry," this weekly program opened, "what a picture it is to
see Hermann Goering's war birds soaring overhead! Boy are
they fast!" Changing to a more serious tone, the voice would
warn in flawless English, "Don't let the British drag America
into this thing, Harry," mearüng the widening war in Europe.
"Don't pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire again."^
Many Iowans were surprised to learn that the broadcaster
they could hear several times each week on the short-wave
radio was one of their own, an Iowa-bom An\erican named
1. Memo, Flinn to Mumford, 15 October 1942, FBI File 65-6568-41, p. 2. See
also Harwood L. Childs and John B. Whitton, eds.. Propaganda by Shortwave
(Princeton, NJ, 1942), 65; Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (London, 1973),
57-60.
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Frederick W. Kaltenbach who worked for the U.S.A. Zone of
Paul Joseph Goebbels's Ministry of Propaganda. Kaltenbach was
one of eight "radio traitors" and one of 141 other Americans
accused of having committed treason by aiding the Axis during
World War H.^
During the immediate postwar years these "renegades"
were thought to be mentally vinbalanced, calloused and ego-
maniacal malcontents, racists, cowards, or misfits, "partial
failures or frustrates," unable to discriminate between reality
and hallucination. Foreign correspondent William L. Shirer, who
knew many of the renegades before the war, described most of
them in a 1943 article as being no different than other "human
derelicts" who were drawn to Nazism during the interwar years
"as a flame attracts a moth." All were believed to be rootless
individuals incapable of integrating into normal society.^
Some renegades were indeed mentally unstable or were
driven by anti-Semitism, greed, unrequited love, or oppor-
tunism; but others, including Frederick Kaltenbach, appear to
have been motivated by ideological zeal and political conviction.
Kaltenbach sincerely believed that fascism was a new, youthful,
and vigorous form of government representing the wave of the
future. Fascism, he was convinced, was capable of saving Ger-
many, the United States, and all of westem civilization from a
worldwide Bolshevik conspiracy. To Kaltenbach, and to many
disillusioned Europeans and Americans during the 1930s, fas-
cism promised to end the social, economic, and political lethargy
that characterized the seemingly feeble and plodding liberal
democracies. To those who had suffered through two decades
2. For the 141 Americans accused of treason, see file 13, box 346, record group
260, Records of the Office of the Military Government, United States, National
Archives. Records on several of the radio traitors may be found in record
group 319, Records of the Army Staff, National Archives. FBI files on Frederick
Kaltenbach were obtained by the author through a Freedom of Information
Act request and are open to the public at FBI Headquarters in Washington,
D.C. The most recent published account of the radio traitors is John Carver
Edwards, Berlin Calling: American Broadcasters in Service to the Third Reich
(Westport, CT, 1991), who discusses Kaltenbach on pp. 8-15.
3. William L. Shirer, "The American Radio Traitors," Harper's Magazine,
October 1943,397. See also Nathaniel Weyl, Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and
Betrayal in American History (Washington, DC, 1950), 361-63.
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of war, revolution, economic depression, and civil unrest. Hitler
and Mussoliru offered visions and ideas that some believed
could lead Europe back to the security, stability, and prosperity
not known since before 1914. Kaltenbach saw himself as a mes-
senger whose mission was to wam Americans of the dangers
presented by Bolshevism. He also saw himself as an oracle sent
to clarify the Nazi philosophy for the American public while
simultaneously combating Hitler's critics. Unlike many of the
renegades, however, Kaltenbach was an educated man from
humble circumstances who gave few indications during his
youth that he would one day become a traitor in the service of
the Third Reich.^
FREDERICK W KALTENBACH was born in Dubuque, Iowa,
on March 29, 1895, the eldest of four sons and one daughter
bom to John Kaltenbach, a Presbyterian butcher who had emi-
grated to the United States from Germany four years before.
Within a year of Frederick's birth, the Kaltenbachs, who were
described by a neighbor as good, honest, and humble people
of the lower class, settled in Waterloo,. Iowa. Frederick seems
to have had a normal childhood, attending the Waterloo Public
Schools prior to his graduation from East High School in 1914.
He was "a studious, introspective youth" and a champion de-
bater, although one neighbor later claimed that Frederick was
an "imcouth and rather sordid person" who was "always antag-
4. For general discussions of treason, see Weyl, Treason; Rebecca West, pseud..
The Meaning of Treason (New York, 1947); Margaret Boveri, Treason in the
Twentieth Century, trans. Jonathan Steinberg (London, 1961); William Schofield,
Treason Trial (New York, 1964); and Kurt Singer, Spies and Traitors of World
War II (New York, 1945). For the attraction of fascism in the interwar period,
see Lawrence Dennis, The Coming American Fascism (New York, 1936); Leland
V. Bell, "The Failure of Nazism in America: The German American Bund,
1936-1941," Political Science Quarterly 85 (1970), 589-99; idem. In Hitler's
Shadow: The Anatomy of American Nazism (Port Washington, NY, 1973); Sander
A. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924-1941 (Ithaca, NY,
1974); Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-
Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970 (New York, 1970); Donald M. McKale,
The Swastika Outside Germany (Kent, OH, 1977); and Ronald W. Johnson, "The
German American Bvmd and Nazi Germany, 1936-1941," Studies in History
and Society 6 (1975), 31-45.
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onistic and 'Communistic' [sic] he could get along with no
one."^
As a high school graduation present from their father,
Frederick and his younger brother Gustav went on a bicycle
tour of Germany. The youths were in Germany when the Great
War began in August 1914 and were arrested by the authorities
on suspicions of espionage. They were detained until December
while the family, with the aid of an Iowa congressman, sought
their release. In spite of this ordeal, and even though he was
bom and raised in America, Frederick loved Germany. He wrote
that during this first visit "I was swept by a poweráil emotion
and something inside me said I am going home."^
On his return to the states, Frederick began a lengthy term
of academic study by entering Grinnell College in Grinnell,
Iowa. During his three years as an undergraduate he demon-
strated talents as both an orator and a debater. He was known
to his classmates as "the Kaiser" and, according to later reports,
did not mix well with the rest of the student body. Kaltenbach
spent much of his free time earning the considerable sum
needed to finance his education by working as a jarütor. In
addition, as was so common in the prewar years when military
preparedness was stressed on campuses, Kaltenbach drilled with
one of the three military units formed at Grinnell.^
Following the close of his junior year Frederick enlisted in
the U.S. Army and was inducted into the service at Waterloo
5. Memo, Flinn to Mumford, 2. See also "Kaltenbach—Chief of Berlin Radio
Propagandists," p. 4, FBI File 65-6568-41 (hereafter cited as "Kaltenbach —
Chief of Berlin Radio Propagandists"); A. C. C. Clifton, "Voice from Berlin
Once an Iowan," Des Moines Register, 24 December 1939, in FBI File 65-6568-5;
Memo, J. Edgar Hoover to Special Agent in Charge, Des Moines, Iowa, 26
February 1940, FBI File 65-6568-6; Charles J. Rolo, "Germany Calling!" Current
History 52 (22 October 1940), 28; and idem. Radio Goes to War: The Fourth Front
(New York, 1942), 97.
6. Kaltenbach, as quoted in Edwards, Berlin Calling, 8. See also "Kaltenbach—
Chief of Berlin Radio Propagandists," 5. Later FBI reports claimed that Kal-
tenbach attempted to join the German army while on this bicycle tour. See
Summary of Facts of the Case, Kaltenbach Treason Indictment, 17 July 1945,
FBI File 65-6568-201 (hereafter cited as Summary of Facts).
7. Clifton, "Voice from Berlin Once an Iowan"; Edwards, Berlin Calling, 8. See
also Shirer, "American Radio Traitors," 402.
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on June 10,1918. Because of his level of education and his prior
student military training, Frederick was commissioned as a sec-
ond lieutenant in the U.S. Army Coastal Artillery. Don Beams
of Ames, Iowa, one of Kaltenbach's bunkmates while they were
stationed at Fort Tilden, New York, told the Iowa Legionnaire
Magazine in 1942 that "Kaltenbach was a heel then, as well as
now." Due to his late enlistment and particular branch of the
army, Kaltenbach never saw service overseas, as the armistice
ending the war was signed soon after his commissioning. He
left the service in April 1919 along with the tens of thousands
of other soldiers honorably discharged in the rush to demobilize
after the war. Soon after he returned home he joined the Water-
loo post of the American Legion and the field artillery reserve,
maintaining memberships in both organizations imtil 1936.*
In the fall of 1919 Kaltenbach resumed his education at Iowa
State Teachers College (now the University of Northem Iowa)
in Cedar Falls, where he earned his B.A. in 1920. Classmates
remembered "Fritz" Kaltenbach as a dogmatic and domineering
personality who was an average student. After graduation,
Kaltenbach worked for seven years as a farm appraiser. Then
he tumed to teaching. He first obtained a position as a high
school American history instructor in Manchester, Iowa. Then
in 1931 he obtained a better job teaching business law, econom-
ics, history, and debate at Dubuque Senior High School. Still
single at age 36, Kaltenbach lived a simple life: he resided at the
YMCA, took French language courses at night, and earned an
M.A. in history from the University of Chicago through courses
completed during his summer vacations. In most respects he
appeared to be a model citizen who worked hard, kept out of
trouble, voted in local and national elections, and served the
community, most notably as the first president of the Waterloo
YMCA, which later struck his name from its records.'
8. Memo, Flinn to Mumford, 1; Iowa Legionnaire Magazine, 16 October 1942,
in Bureau Letter to Baltimore, 30 November 1942, FBI File 65-6568, no. 15628;
"Kaltenbach—Chief of Berlin Radio Propagandists," 5; and Summary of Facts.
See also Edwards, Berlin Calling, 8; and Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 28.
9. Summary of Facts; Edwards, Berlin Calling, 8; Shirer, "American Radio
Traitors," 402; and Memo, Flinn to Mumford, 2. On Kaltenbach and the Water-
loo YMCA, see Waterloo Daily Courier, 26 January 1946, in FBI File 65-6568-85.
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IN JUNE 1933 Kaltenbach received a scholarship from the Uni-
versity of Berlin to work on a Ph.D., so he was granted a two-
year leave of absence from teaching to pursue graduate study
in Germany. Germany had changed considerably since his 1914
visit, having endured the First World War, revolution, hyper-
inflation, political instability, and the worst effects of the Great
Depression. The American was shocked by the conditions he
observed, but encouraged by the promise he saw in the new
Nazi regime. "There was unemployment ever)m?^here," he wrote,
"and in the industrial areas every one of them [workers] were
Commimists, while Jews were living in luxury. Then Hitler
came and gave the German people a new lease on life."^°
Following two years of study, during which time he ob-
served firsthand the changes made by the Nazis, Kaltenbach
returned to Dubuque. Immediately he set off a storm of contro-
versy. In the fall of 1935 he formed a high school student group
named the Militant Order of Spartan Knights. While the organi-
zation was innocently named after the school's mascot, it bore
the unmistakable characteristics of the Nazi Hitler Youth move-
ment. Under Kaltenbach's leadership the coed group held secret
initiation rituals, dressed in brown military-style uniforms, and
allegedly carried menacing walking sticks during their weekend
hikes. The group's activities raised the suspicions of the local
community. Hoping to allay them, the Americanism Committee
of Dubuque's American Legion called Kaltenbach to appear
before the group to explain his actions. The meeting did not go
well. According to one Legionnaire, "as he [Kaltenbach] stepped
from the Legion platform, after lecturing on his doctrine of
leadership, a Legionnaire floored him with a blow to the jaw.
Other Legionnaires also got in a few licks in registering what
they termed an active protest before order was restored." Kal-
tenbach allegedly threatened the post commander and promised
revenge. The school board subsequently disbanded Kaltenbach's
youth group and in June 1936 terminated his teaching contract."
10. Kaltenbach, as quoted in Edwards, Berlin Calling, 8-9. See also Summary
of Facts.
11. "Kaltenbach—Chief of Berlin Radio Propagandists," 6; Summary of Facts;
Edwards, Berlin Calling, 9; and Shirer, "American Radio Traitors," 402.
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Following his dismissal, Kaltenbach returned to Germany
to resume his studies. He supported himself as a free-lance
writer and translator who on occasion worked for the short-
wave radio network of the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda.'^
During this period Kaltenbach also wrote a monograph titled
Self-Determination dealing with the controversial territorial settle-
ments of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. In that work he con-
demned the Allied powers and the language tests, ethnological
statistics, and election returns used to determine postwar na-
tional boundaries and ethnic memberships. To Kaltenbach,
"Nationality" was "a state of mind, a subjective psychological
feeling that transcends race," and was largely sentimental. It
was not something that could be arbitrarily created by diplo-
macy. "Blood is thicker than water," Kaltenbach wrote, "and
those who lightly choose to disregard this do so at their peril."
Kaltenbach said that writing Self-Determination convinced him
of the justice of the Nazi cause. Already a German ultranation-
alist, he became an indiscriminate supporter of the Nazis."
As Kaltenbach neared completion of his studies in February
1939, he married Dorothea Peters, a 38-year-old German woman
from an old military family. His new wife had contacts within
the Nazi Party and was herself employed as a secretary on the
staff of one of Luftwaffe Chief Hermann Goering's aviation
journals. Within weeks of their marriage, Kaltenbach was placed
in contact with those controlling the U.S.A. Zone of the Nazi
short-wave radio network and was hired as a broadcaster along
with several other Americans living in Germany." Soon there-
12. Memo, Flirui to Mun\ford, 2; Clifton, "Voice from Berlin Once an Iowan."
A newspaper report later clainied that Kaltenbach had declined a U.S. State
Department job at this time paying an annual salary of $3,600. FBI records
do not mention this.
13. Edwards, Berlin Calling, 9. See also Washington Star, 21 July 1946. Kalten-
bach's book is Self-Determination (London, 1938).
14. For the radio traitors, see Shirer, "American Radio Traitors," 397-401; Allan
Miche, "Letters to Iowa," Reader's Digest 36 Oune 1940), 17-21; J. O. Rennie,
"Dr. Goebbels' Awkward Squad," Atlantic 172 (September 1943), 107; David
G. Wittels, "Hitler's Short Wave Rumor Factory," Saturday Evening Post 215
(21 November 1942), 12-13; and Samuel Lipman, "German Wartime Broad-
casts," Commentary 63 (March 1977), 72-75.
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after the newlyweds went on a honeymoon in the United States
with all their expenses paid by the Ministi-y of Propaganda.
During their trip to America, the Kaltenbachs visited all of
Frederick's siblings, stopping first to see his brother Gustav, a
clergyman with the First Presbyterian Church in Ironwood,
Michigan. The elder Kaltenbach prevailed upon his younger
brother to allow him to speak from the pulpit, where he pre-
sented a lecture on the Nazi philosophy. Frederick and his wife
next went to Ottumwa, Iowa, to visit another brother, Erwin J.
"Butch" Kaltenbach, a teacher and basketball coach at Ottumwa
High School. Kaltenbach took every opportunity to address local
citizens' groups on National Socialism. In early April he spoke
to both the Ottumwa Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs and to student
groups at the University of Iowa in Iowa City. While his com-
ments were generally received negatively by his audiences, one
concerned citizen later claimed that many people, especially the
impressionable students at the University of Iowa, "were actu-
ally taken in with his suavity and reasoning."'^
Kaltenbach's last stop was at his hometown of Waterloo,
where he visited his dying father, a widower since 1930, and
other nearby siblings. Kaltenbach's father, who died on May 20,
1939, while Frederick was en route back to Germany, was an
ardent German nationalist until the day he died, even though
he had been a naturalized American citizen since 1896; and he
was reportedly quite proud of his son's work for the Nazi
government.'*
During his stay in Waterloo, Kaltenbach addressed a May
Day Rotarian luncheon at the Russell-Lampson Hotel. In his
speech on the virtues of National Socialism, he referred to
Germany's 1936 reoccupation of the Rhineland as "moving irito
her own backyard," and he defended the 1938 Austrian An-
schluss and 1939 dismemberment of Czechoslovakia as self-
15. See [name deleted] to J. Edgar Hoover, 3 February 1940, FBI FUe 65-6568-55;
Edwards, Berlin Calling, 9; Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 28; Memo, Flinn to
Mumford, 3; "Kaltenbach—Chief of Berlin Radio Propagandists," 4; and Sum-
mary of Facts. See also Chicago Sunday Tribune, 3 December 1942; and Washing-
ton Post, moming edition, 12 September 1942, both in FBI File 65-6568-A.
16. Summary of Facts; Edwards, Berlin Calling, 9; Shirer, "American Radio
Traitors," 398; and Rolo, Radio Goes to War, 97.
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determination in the strictest sense as advocated by Woodrow
Wilson. In perhaps one of his more ominous statements, he told
the Rotarians that "Germany will take over the Polish Corridor
and the Free City of Danzig whenever she wants to." For his
lecture Kaltenbach received twenty-five dollars and, according
to one source, a round of jeers and catcalls. Many in the group
openly denounced him as a Nazi agent. Within days the
Kaltenbachs cut short their plans to stay in Iowa all summer and
hurriedly returned to Germany, allegedly to aid in the prepara-
tions for the Nazi attack on Poland set for September 1,1939. '^'
SHORTLY BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN Kaltenbach went on the
air as a propagandist. Slowly, over the course of months, he was
identified by radio monitors employed by the Foreign Broadcast
Intelligence Service of the Federal Commurücaüons Commission
(FBIS/FCC) in the United States. By Thanksgiving 1939 Kalten-
bach had revealed enough about himself in his monitored Mon-
day night broadcasts to be identified as an American from Iowa.
He later removed any doubts when he sent a postcard to the
Waterloo Daily Courier informing Iowans when they could hear
his four weekly broadcasts over Nazi short-wave stations.^*
Soon after the war began. State Department officials con-
tacted all Americans living in Germany, including Kaltenbach,
to encourage them to return home before they were stranded
abroad. Kaltenbach ignored this advice and asked instead that
his residence visa be extended until February 1940, a request
that was granted. When this term expired and Kaltenbach was
once more encouraged to return to America, he again declined,
stating that he was very busy with his work as a translator and
broadcaster and that he wished to remain in Germany for the
duration, citing plans to publish a book on the recent Polish
campaign. During questioning he reaffirmed his loyalty to the
17. Quotes from Waterloo Daily Courier, 1 May 1939. See also Edwards, Berlin
Calling, 9; Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 28; "Kaltenbach—Chief of Berlin Radio
Propagandists," 6; and Clifton, "Voice from Berlin Once an Iowan."
18. "Kaltenbach—Chief of Berlin Radio Propagandists," 4; Clifton, "Voice from
Berlin Once an Iowan"; and news article of unknown origin titled "Kaltenbach
Gives Radio Talks from Berlin to Iowans," in FBI File 65-6568-5.
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United States and claimed no love for Nazism. He did, however,
declare the deepest sympathy for the German people. When
inquiries were made about his employer and his role as a radio
broadcaster, Kaltenbach stated that ever since visiting Germany
in 1914 he had done what he could to "further the relations
between the land of my father, Germany, and my native land,
America. I love them both." He told American officials how
proud he was of his Nazi Party affiliations and emplo5anent
with the Ministry of Propaganda. Taking into account his em-
ployment by a foreign government, the State Department re-
fused to grant a new extension of Kaltenbach's visa when it
expired in April 1940.''
How far Kaltenbach had converted to National Socialism
by 1939 is not clear, but he had publicly voiced strong Nazi
sympathies in the past, and, like most Nazis, he was an anti-
Semite with an arrogant disdain for democracy. Yet he contin-
ued to claim a dual patriotism and saw his service to the Nazis
as being in the best interests of both Germany and the United
States. It was evident that Kaltenbach saw no conflict of interest
between his work for the Nazis, his German heritage, and his
American citizenship. As he had written to a friend in 1937,
"We German-Americans with our traditional conservatism can-
not stand by and see our American spiritual heritage threatened
by Bolsheviks like labor leader [John L.] Lewis and his ilk. We
still cling to those ideals of homespun Democracy which Lincoln
stood for. The German element helped Lincoln save the union.
Maybe we are today called to save America." Kaltenbach also
indicated a strong belief that National Socialism represented a
bulwark against Communism. He viewed the leaders of the
Soviet Uruon as blood-stained criminals who were seeking to
overthrow the West in league with Jews and other anti-Nazi
elements. Like many other Europeans, Kaltenbach believed in
the slogan "better Hitler than Stalin." Stung by American criti-
cisms of Hitler that he thought were unjust and without merit,
Kaltenbach claimed publicly that such rhetoric was motivated
by American jealously of Germany's renaissance during the
19. Kaltenbach, quoted in Edwards, Berlin Calling, 8. See also Memo, Flinn to
Mumford, 2.
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1930s. "Roosevelt," he explained, "knew he could not tackle the
social ills the way the Americans thought he could and should,
and the only way was to blame Hitler for his [Roosevelt's]
failure and to detract public criticism by focusing attention on
an imaginary threat from the other side of the ocean."^°
American journalist Joseph C. Harsch, writing for the Chris-
tian Science Monitor, claimed that Kaltenbach was "the most
effective [radio traitor] from the German point of view because
he . . . is also sincere in his Nazism." Commenting on Kalten-
bach's engaging personality and "courage—even when it comes
to differences of opinion with his employers," Harsch recalled
that Kaltenbach had "preached and argued it [Nazism] with me
most of the way from Berlin to Paris on a three-day bus tirip."^^
William Shirer, who also knew Kaltenbach, agreed that the
Iowan was "most sincere in his conversion to Nazism. He really
believed in it He remained essentially German in outlook
and like so many other Germans was early attiracted to the
mysticism—or whatever it was—of Nazism." Shirer, a fellow
Iowan, later recalled that Kaltenbach was present when the
French surrendered to the Nazis at Compiégne on June 22,1940.
Shirer would "never forget him [Kaltenbach] standing by my
side outside the little railway carriage. . . . Through the car
windows you could see [Wilhelm] Keitel read the French the
armistice terms. Kaltenbach, as if in a tirance, gazed longingly
at his Führer as other men might gaze toward their god. It was
no surprise, then, when he elected to remain in Germany and
betray his country" "He was," Shirer concluded, "a bom Nazi."^
Kaltenbach's radio work soon became an integral part of the
Nazis' worldwide propaganda campaign intended to undermine
enemy morale and influence public opinion in the United States
against intervention in the war. Paul Joseph Goebbels, as the
Reich Minister of Propaganda, contiroUed the German overseas
short-wave broadcasting network {Deutsche Kurzwellensender)
that employed 250 people to produce and broadcast 126 hours
20. Memo, Flirui to Mumford, 3; quotes from Edwards, Berlin Calling, 8-10.
See also Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 28, and idem, Radio Goes to War, 97.
21. Edwards, Berlin Calling, 12.
22. Shirer, "American Radio Traitors," 402-3.
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of propaganda daily in 14 languages. From their studios at
Naven, Germany, and from ten short-wave transmitters located
near Berlin at Zeesen, Nazi broadcasters were beaming twelve
hours of short-wave broadcasts to the United States each day
by 1939.^
Nazi propaganda policy was developed by Goebbels at daily
staff conferences followed by smaller meetings dealing with
each targeted geographic region. The heads of the U.S.A. Zone
would then brief broadcasters and commentators heard by
North American audiences. According to U.S. analysts, Nazi
propaganda sought to split Americans from their leaders and
pit labor against management, blacks against whites, and Gen-
tiles against Jews. Clear attempts were made to enflame Amer-
ican isolationist passions against interventionists, all the while
enhancing the image of Nazi Germany. To find broadcasters
who could make their propaganda palatable to American audi-
ences, the Nazis looked for individuals with a knowledge of the
country and its culture, selecting Americans like Kaltenbach or
Germans who had resided in the United States for an extended
period.^*
23. For the Nazi propaganda machine, see Daniel Lang, "Berlin Sends Radio
Greetings," New Republic 97 (11 January 1939), 279; Harold N. Graves, Jr.,
"European Radio and the War," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences 213 Qanuary 1941), 80. See also Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 57-59;
Derrick Singleton and Arthur Weidenfeld, The Goebbels Experiment: A Study
of the Nazi Propaganda Machine (New Haven, CT, 1943), 77,81-84,100,143,146,
173, 181-82, 185; Hideyo Kumata and Wilber Schramm, "The Propaganda'
Theory of the German Nazis," in A Psychological Warfare Casebook, ed. William
E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (BalHmore, 1958), 53; Childs and Whitton,
Propaganda by Shortwave, 19-21; Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American
Hemisphere, 1933-1945 (New Haven, CT, 1967), 21-22; and Michael L. G.
Balfour, Propaganda in War (London, 1979), 15, 24.
24. Childs and Whitton, Propaganda by Shortwave, 80-107. See also Jerome S.
Bruner, "The Dimensions of Propaganda: German Short Wave Broadcasts to
America," Joumal of Abnormal Psychology 36 (1941), 315, 317-19, 324-27, 330;
Rolo, Radio Goes to War, 644-46; Graves, "European Radio and the War'" 8li
Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 96; "Propaganda for
Blitzkrieg," in Propaganda Analysis, 4 vols. (New York, 1942), 3:105-11. For
other works on Nazi propaganda, see Leonard W. Doob, "Goebbels' Principles
of Propaganda," Political Science Quarterly 14 (1950), 419-42; Jay W. Baird, The
Mythical World of Nazi Propaganda, 1939-1945 (Minneapolis, 1975); and Ernst
Kris, German Radio Propaganda (London, 1944).
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German broadcasting, according to widely distributed pro-
gramming guides, consisted of "a choice assortment of broad-
casting viands, sparkling musical champagne and other tasty
delicacies . . . as well as the regular news features," including
four hours daily of the spoken word. Morning programs began
at 6 a.m. (EST) in the United States and lasted for three hours,
after which time signals from closer radio stations interfered
with audio quality. The evening schedule would begin anew
at 4:50 p.m. and continue until 1 a.m. In addition to broadcasts
beamed directly to America, U.S. citizens could als^ o receive
Nazi transmissions to Britain beginning at 2:15 p.m.^ ^
Programs were tailored to a wide range of tastes and all
levels of culture, although the language and arguments dif-
fered according to the intended audience. For highbrow audi-
ences Berlin produced topical talks, dramatic monologues, and
question-and-answer periods; and a special series for intellec-
tuals called "The College Hour" presented lectures such as
"British Disregard for American Rights," "Paul Revere Rides
Again," "Germany as I See It—By an American in Berlin," and
"The U.S. and Germany—Past and Present." Yet most programs
were aimed at common folk and were presented in folksy,
idiomatic language, packed with wisecracks appealing to the
lowest corrunon denominator. Programming always focused on
simple themes and ideas that were repeated frequently. For
homemakers the Nazis produced the "Zeesen Women's Club,"
business people had an "Economics Review" program, German-
Americans had German language programs, while gossips and
scandal-mongers were entertained by "Charley's Cabaret" and
"Mr. O.K." Anti-Semites gained perspectives on the "Jewish
question" in a program called "The Jew in American History,"
and "for those who like Vox Pop or Amos 'n' Andy," according
to one guide, "Berlin presents colloquial dialogues between 'Jim
and Johnny,' 'Fritz and Fred—The Friendly Quarrelers,' and the
'Letters to *^
25. Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 21, 31; Weyl, Treason, 369-70.
26. Bruner, "The Dimensions of Propaganda," 330; Childs and Whitton,
Propaganda by Shortwave, 307-8; Graves, "European Radio and the War," 82;
and Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 27.
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It was the "Letters to Iowa" program that introduced Kal-
tenbach to Americans, in particular to residents of the Midwest,
who were thought to hold more isolationist views than Ameri-
cans elsewhere. Kaltenbach was particularly suited to these
programs, given his midwestem accent and radio style that was
described as "informal, larded with American idiom." He was
fond of puns, jingles, name calling, and gag lines, and often
ridiculed Prime Minister Winston Churchill as "Roly-poly
Windsy" and former Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as
"the Umbrella Man." The BBC was the "BuUitt-Biddle Corpora-
tion—Atrocity Manufacturers Unlimited," and listeners were
encouraged to join the fictitious "British Lion Tamers' Club
opened to East Indians, Irishmen, Japanese, and all others who
had opposed British hegemony. "^ ^
The 1939 to 1941 "Letters to Iowa" programs consisted of
purely anti-Roosevelt, anti-British, and isolationist propaganda
subtly disguised as Kaltenbach's letters home read over the
radio because his mail was allegedly routinely intercepted,
censored, or destroyed by the British. The programs opened
with "greetings to my old friend, Harry, in Iowa." One such
broadcast in 1940 asked Harry, "How are all the folks and how
is our old schoolmaster?" Attempting to evoke nostalgia and
establish his Iowa roots, thereby making his information seem
more "down home" and trustworthy, Kaltenbach once asked
Harry if he remembered the pumpkin pies they used to eat
together. "German housewives don't make pumpkin pies,"
Kaltenbach revealed, "but they get swell eating out of pumpkins
in other ways." Kaltenbach would usually push propaganda in
the form of advice, stating on one occasion, "Don't fall for any
British propaganda, Harry. . . . It's all the bimko cooked up by
that liar Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Sea Bottom. "^ ^
27. Edwards, Berlin Calling, 11.
28. Quoted from "Propaganda via Short-Wave: Fred Talks to 'Dear Harry,'"
m Propaganda Analysis, 3:59; and Singleton, and Weidenfeld, The Goebbels
Experiment, 185-86. The "Harry" of the "Letters to Iowa" program was Harry
H. Hagemarui, a Waverly, Iowa, lawyer who was a childhood acquaintance
of Kaltenbach's apparently chosen at random for the broadcasts. Hagemann
died in 1970. His widow and several relatives still reside in Waverly. Don L.
Hagemann to author, 1 June 1993.
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Kaltenbach's broadcasts were also heard in Great Britain,
where he was soon nicknamed "Lord Hee-Haw" to distinguish
him from the more prominent Nazi propagandist of Irish-
American extraction, William Joyce, who was already dubbed
Lord "Haw-Haw."^' Kaltenbach welcomed the publicity and
began to sign off using the new nickname. While most listeners
characterized his broadcasts as light, simple, direct, unemotional,
and devoid of vituperative outbursts, two radio monitors had
a different assessment. "Kaltenbach's delivery and speech are
marked by a certain ponderousness of approach and a heavy
Teutonic brand of humor," they noted. "He is a typical represen-
tative of the atmosphere of labored facetiousness characteristic
of the bulk of German transmissions for North America. Nearly
every one of his broadcasts conveys this atmosphere."^"
By mid-1940 Kaltenbach had become so useful to the Nazis
that his radio roles were increased to include Jim, the "smart-
alecky Canadian," and "Honest American Fred" of the "Jim and
Johnny" and "Fred and Fritz" programs. Later, Kaltenbach an-
nounced the topical talks and hosted the Saturday-evening
"Military Review" program as well as a series of broadcasts
titled "British Disregard for American Rights." He could be
heard throughout America on Monday and Saturday evenings
and Thursday and Friday aftemoons.^^
Kaltenbach was a part of the major Nazi propaganda effort
launched in 1940 to prevent President Roosevelt's re-election to
an imprecedented third term of office, an event the Nazis knew
would ensure continued support for Britain. When Nazi propa-
29. The two were often confused in newspaper accounts. See, for example,
Chicago Sunday Tribune, 3 December 1942; and Washington Post, morning
edition, 12 September 1942, both in FBI File 65-6568-A.
30. For the critique of Kaltenbach's style, see Singleton and Weidenfeld, The
Goebbels Experiment, 185. See also news article of unknown origin titled
"Kaltenbach Gives Radio Talks from Berlin to Iowans," in FBI File 65-6568-5;
Rolo, "Germany Calling," 28; and Edwards, Berlin Calling, 10-11.
31. "Kaltenbach Gives Radio Talks"; Edwards, Berlin Calling, 10-11. For
transcripts of Kaltenbach's broadcasts, program titles, dates, and statiorw on
which they aired, see FBI Files 65-6568-40, 45, 46, 88, 157, 182, 201. FBI File
65-6568-198 contains a complete five-page broadcast transcript from 21 July
1942; FBI File 65-6568-201 contains similar program transcripts for 30 July 1943
and 5 January 1944.
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ganda failed to bring about Roosevelt's defeat, the broadcasters
shifted the emphasis to attack the efforts of the president and
the interventionists to aid Britain, especially during the cam-
paign surrounding the Lend-Lease Bill in March 1941. Concern-
ing the Lend-Lease Act, Lord Hee-Haw remarked to Harry over
the airwaves.
Now that Roosevelt has signed the Lend-Lease Bill I suppose the
Germans should be bowing before the new lords of the universe,
George VI and Emperor Roosevelt I. The Germans have been too
busy dropping their iron pellets on Englishmen to worry about
the "Union Now" boys in Washington. There is no doubt, how-
ever, that Bill 1776 cancels out the year 1776. Compared with the
patriots of 1941 Benedict Arnold was a mere piker. All he did was
to betray a fort to the Redcoats. The "Union Now" boys have be-
trayed a whole country.^ ^
As U.S. support for Britain increased in 1941, Kaltenbach and
his colleagues sought to convince Americans that Britain was
lost and that any attempts to aid them would embroil Ameri-
cans in a disastrous and bloody war with Germany. In the
"Letters to Iowa" programs Kaltenbach urged Harry "not to bet
his money on the wrong horse, because I'd sure hate to see my
American friends grab the short end of the purse."^^
The "Letters to Iowa" programs fell far short of the goal of
keeping the United States out of the war, and they failed to
mold public opinion in favor of the Nazis. Yet they did bring
Kaltenbach to the attention of many people in the Hawkeye
state. Although it was originally thought that few Americans
listened to Nazi broadcasts, it was later revealed that 150,000
to 300,000 Americans heard them. Until it was closed in June
1941, the German Library of Information in New York City
mailed out 75,000 free bilingual program guides and 3,000
matrices each week, largely to the East and Midwest, as part of
32. Program quoted from Singleton and Weidenfeld, The Goebbels Experiment,
186. For dates and times of Kaltenbach's broadcasts during this period, see
Edwards, Berlin Calling, 13; Memo, Flinn to Mumford, 3-4; and Waterloo Daily
Courier, 7 June 1942.
33. Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 28-29; Edwards, Berlin Calling, 13.
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its "zone services." These guides contained information on
shows and features, broadcast tinies, and gossipy articles on
short-wave personalities. Anierican newspapers and radio maga-
zines also carried program schedules. In retum, the Nazi short-
wave system allegedly received 50,000 letters annually from
Americans, while the NBC station in New York City, one of the
nation's most powerful transmitters, received only 20,000. Kal-
tenbach himself received regular fan mail sent to his business
address given as "Iowa. In care of the German short-wave
station, Berlin." He in turn was a stickler for acknowledging
fans in his broadcasts, and he encouraged more letters via air
mail, "where British snoopers can't get at them."^
KALTENBACH'S AUDIENCE, however, included far more
powerful groups than British censors and Iowa farmers. The FBI
had taken an interest in Kaltenbach as early as January 1940,
when lowans began to write unsolicited letters to FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover informing him of Kaltenbach's radio broadcasts
and his promotion of Nazism, especially during his 1939 visit.
Hoover in turn informed Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle
that although the FBI was not actively investigating Kaltenbach's
activities, it was interested in any information the State Depart-
ment had. Hoover also sought the State Department's advice
on how to deal with Kaltenbach if he were ever to retum to the
United States. Meanwhile, other federal offices were taking no-
tice of Kaltenbach as well, including the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) and the Foreign Information Service
of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (FIS/COI) under
34. Childs and Whitton, Propaganda by Shortwave, 307; Bruner, "The Dimensions
of Propaganda," 335-36; Rolo, "Germany Calling!" 31; Zeman, Nazi Propaganda,
60; Graves, "European Radio and the War," 80-61; Lang, "Berlin Sends Radio
Greetings," 280-81; Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, Sabotage: The Secret
War Against America (New York, 1944), 173; Rolo, Radio Goes to War, 98.
Americans belonging to private radio monitoring groups informed the federal
government that the Nazi programs could hardly help but find an audience.
In 1940 Americans owned between 44 and 45 nullion radios, 30 percent of
which had short-wave bands. Over 82 percent of American families had at
least one radio that they listened to an average of 4.3 hours per day. See Paul
F. Peter, "The American Listener in 1940," Annals of the American Academy of
the Political and Social Sciences 213 Oanuary 1941), 1-3.
236 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
William J. Donovan. The FIS/COI (later the OSS and CIA) regu-
larly tuned in to the radio traitors and in October 1941 compiled
for President Roosevelt an extensive study on Americans broad-
casting from Berlin.^ ^
Even though Kaltenbach was an American citizen conduct-
ing anti-American broadcasts for a foreign goverrunent, his
activities were not yet illegal. As a citizen he could accept em-
ployment by a foreign govemment and exercise his right to free
speech over the airwaves, regardless of how odious that speech
was to his fellow Americans. That changed once the United
States entered the war against Germany on December 11,1941.
Yet Kaltenbach and the radio traitors continued their broadcasts,
even though they had failed in their main goal of keeping the
Americans out of the war and stifling aid to Britain. The new
Nazi goal was to vmdermine America's morale and will to resist
with the same tactics used against Britain. Now, however,
Kaltenbach's patentiy pro-Nazi, anti-Allied, and anti-American
broadcasts were no longer mere objectionable exercises of free
speech by an American overseas; they were suddenly trans-
formed into acts of treason committed by a citizen serving a
nation with which his country was at war. After 1941, each time
Kaltenbach spoke into a live radio microphone he committed
an act of treason punishable by death.^*
Within a week of the attack on Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt wrote to Coordinator of Information Donovan, asking
him to "talk with State and Justice [Departments] as to what
should be done, now that we are at war . . . in the case of
American citizens who are working for enemy governments."^''
Several months later, J. Edgar Hoover suggested in a memo to
35. For early FBI interest in Kaltenbach, see Memo, [name deleted] to Hoover,
30 lanuary 1940; and Memo, Hoover to Berle, 30 January 1940, both in FBI
File 65-6568-2. For COI involvement, see R&A Report to FIS on Foreign Broad-
casts from Berlin, 6 October 1941, box 8, record group 208, Records of the
Office of War formation. National Archives.
36. Edwards, Berlin Calling, 10.
37. Quoted in Elliott Roosevelt and Joseph P. Lash, eds., FDR: His Personal
Letters, 1928-1945, 4 vols. (New York, 1950), 2:1258, as found in box 16,
Edward P. Lilly Papers, record group 218, Records of the United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff, National Archives. See also box 2, ibid.
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Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge that Kaltenbach and
two other radio traitors be indicted for treason and tried as soon
as they entered the United States. Hoover insisted that some
immediate action be taken in 1942 to bring indictments because
"if the matter is approached in a lackadaisical manner and no
action taken until after their return, it is feared that postwar
lethargy may prevent adequate attention being given this mat-
ter." Treasonous scoundrels such as Kaltenbach should be se-
verely punished. Hoover believed, to prevent others from imi-
tating their actions. "This situation," he argued, "has arisen
largely as the result of totalitarian methods developed since the
last war for the purpose of influencing the home front. Due to
the high development and efficiency of the radio, traitors to the
American way of life, who are well fitted by language and back-
ground, are obviously being exploited by the Axis powers to
further their own purposes."^* Within months of Hoover's
memo, Roosevelt repeated his idea to Attomey General Francis
Biddle that "there are a number of Americans in Europe who
are aiding Hitler . . . on the radio. Why should we not proceed
to indict them for treason even though we might not be able to
try them until after the war?"^' Others expressed similar opin-
ions, adding that the death penalty was more than justified for
those convicted of treason. Even federal judicial officials, such
as Special Prosecutor Oscar R. Ewing, who had recently ob-
tained convictions of several pro-fascist leaders, echoed the calls
for indictments and capital punishment on conviction.^
Roosevelt's memo prompted Biddle to order Hoover to
launch an investigation of Kaltenbach and his fellow collabora-
tors in late 1942. The FBI immediately dispatched agents from
Washington, D.C, and seven field offices to interview Kalten-
bach's former employers, classmates, siblings, neighbors, and
38. Memo, Hoover to Berge, 25 April 1942, FBI File 65-6568-30, p. 6. The others
being considered for treason indictments at that time were Jane Anderson and
Edward L. Delaney. Hoover suggested that propagandist Constance Drexel,
who was a naturalized American, undergo denaturalization proceedings.
39. Quoted in Roosevelt, FDR: Personal Letters, 2:1348.
40. Waterloo Daily Courier, 28 August 1942; and Washington Post, 28 August
1942, both in FBI File 65-6568-1.
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acquaintances in nine Iowa cities and locations in four other
states. Agents crisscrossed the nation trying to locate anyone
who had ever had contact, however slight, with Lord Hee-Haw,
including "Harry," the Waverly lawyer addressed in the "Letters
to Iowa" programs.^'
Among those questioned were Kaltenbach's brothers and
sister. All of the siblings told the FBI that they were not in
sympathy with what their brother was doing and that he was
motivated more by money than ideology. These explanations
were well known and had already appeared in the Des Moines
Register when the Kaltenbachs were interviewed in late 1939.
One brother thought that Frederick was perhaps "sympathetic
with the Nazi cause, but that the rest of the family lives in
America and believes in American principles." "We're Ameri-
cans," Frederick's sister said. "We carmot be responsible for my
brother's opinions." The FBI received little new information
from the family, none of whom maintained contact with Fred-
erick after 1941. None had listened to his broadcasts, even
though Lord Hee-Haw was heard four times each week in their
area. The subsequent FBI report stated that "the immediate
family . . . has an excellent reputation for loyalty to the Urüted
States." One brother, the FBI revealed, was serving with the
U.S. Army, while the other brother. Rev. Gustav A. Kaltenbach,
had entered the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps.*^
The FBI's evidence was supplemented by articles gleaned
from newspaper morgues in Waterloo, Dubuque, Des Moines,
Chicago, Washington, D.C., and New York City, and by tran-
scripts of Kaltenbach's programs that were intercepted and
recorded by the FCC's Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service
41. Agents from Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Chicago, Denver, Milwaukee,
Baltimore, Portland, and Des Moines participated and interviewed people in
Waterloo, Cedar Falls, Waverly, Grinnell, Ottumwa, Des Moines, Fort Dodge,
Manchester, and Dubuque, Iowa; Ironwood and Grand Rapids, Michigan;
Denver, Colorado; Janesville, Wisconsin; and Portland and Eugene, Oregon.
For the details of the investigation, see Summary of Facts; Memo, Flinn to
Mumford, 3; "Kaltenbach—Chief of Berlin Radio Propagandists," 4; Chicago
Sunday Tribune, 3 December 1942, and Washington Post, morning edition, 12
September 1942, both in FBI File 65-6568-A; Clifton, "Voice from Berlin Once
an Iowan."
42. Summary of Facts; Clifton, "Voice from Berlin Once an Iowan."
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(FBIS) Monitoring Station, code-named "Shinda," at Silver Hill,
Maryland, outside Washington, D.C. Every broadcast that
Kaltenbach made after December 11, 1941, was recorded, and
by the following October more than 126 long-playing records
were available for the use of federal prosecutors. Each revealed
the time, date, station frequency, call letters, and origin of the
broadcast, the subject and program title, its length and language
of delivery, and the identity of the announcer.^ The FBIS char-
acterized these broadcasts as "generally critical of the Allied
war leaders"; they were clearly "intended to raise doubts in the
minds of American citizens over the wisdom of participating
in the war at all." Witnesses were available, the FBIS added,
"who have heard the broadcasts and/or can recognize the
Subject [Kaltenbach], and/or can identify that they have seen
the Subject in Germany." In order to get an exact recording
of Kaltenbach's voice that could be scientifically confirmed
as his, the FBI made anonymous appeals via fan mail that
Kaltenbach spell out, letter-by-letter, the names of American
POWs during one of his broadcasts rather than just recite
their names. Kaltenbach, not suspecting the true reason for
this request, fully complied, slowly and clearly enunciating
the letters in the names of several POWs during an April 1943
program. This recording was added to the growing body of
evidence against him.**
On January 13 the Justice Department confirmed abundant
rumors that the FBI was investigating those accused of being
Nazi propagandists. The FBI had sought to compile an over-
whelming mass of material to ensure treason indictments; the
FBI file on Kaltenbach alone eventually exceeded five hundred
pages.*^ The evidence was presented to a federal grand jury in
Washington, D.C, in the spring of 1943, and indictments were
43. More than 800 boxes of FBIS transcripts, digests, and recordings of
monitored foreign broadcasts from 1940-1946 are available in record group
262, Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, National Archives.
44. Summary of Facts. For lists of Kaltenbach's broadcasts, see FBI Files 65-
6568-40, 45, 46, 88,157, and 182. The details of the program Kaltenbach was
requested to make are described in FBI Files 65-6568-105 and 106.
45. J. Kevin O'Brien, Chief FOIA Section, FBI, Washington, D.C, to author,
21 January 1992.
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were returned against Kaltenbach and eight others on July 26.^ *
No warrant was issued for Kaltenbach's arrest since he was still
in Germany, but Hoover intended to have a warrant ready and
waiting the second he set foot on U.S. soil.^ ^
Hoover sent information on Kaltenbach and the other in-
dicted traitors to the U.S. Office of War Information, to Criminal
Investigation Corps (CIC) officers in the 12th Army Group, and
to officers of the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD/SHAEF)
in Europe so they could apprehend Kaltenbach when Germany
fell. PWD/SHAEF had already compiled their own list of 46
American and 45 British renegades suspected of collaborating
with the Nazis; that list eventually grew to include 141 Ameri-
cans. PWD issued detailed instructions for the treatment of these
renegades once they were captured, and encouraged its person-
nel to scour all captured radio facilities in occupied Europe and
Germany for evidence in the form of recordings, correspon-
dence, pay vouchers, and employment records that could aid
in convicting each suspect.*^
Kaltenbach was stunned when he heard the BBC announce-
ment of his indictment. He broadcast a reply on July 30,1943,
sounding, to William Shirer, "as though he were hurt." "Techni-
cally I suppose I am guilty of treason," he conceded, "of treason
to Roosevelt and his warmongers, but not to the American
people." Kaltenbach declared that he served the Reich "out of
46. The other radio traitors indicted were Jane Anderson (from Atlanta), Robert
Best (Sumter, SC), Douglas Chandler (Baltimore), Edward L. Delaney (Olney,
IL), Constance Drexel (Philadelphia), and Max Otto Koischwitz and Ezra
Pound (New York City). Mildred Gillars ("Axis Sally") from Columbus, Ohio,
although later prosecuted and imprisoned, was not among those indicted in
1943.
47. Washington Daily News, 13 January 1943, in FBI File 65-6568-78; the
indictment is contained in Summary of Facts.
48. Memo, SHAEF to All Concerned, 10 December 1944, and Memo, SHAEF
to Circulation, 2 April 1945, both in box 26, record group 331, Records of
Allied Operational and Occupational Headquarters, World War II, Records
of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, 1942-1945, National Archives.
See also Memo, Head Special Warfare Branch, ONI, OP-16-W, U.S. Navy to
Overseas Branch, OWI, 20 November 1943, box 109, record group 208, Na-
tional Archives; Memo, [name deleted], to Director, FBI, 21 October 1944, FBI
File 65-6568-182; and Memo, J. A. Cimperman, Assistant Legal Attaché, U.S.
Embassy, London, to Director, FBI, 4 September 1944, FBI File 65-6568-178.
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a genuine desire to promote good relations between Germany,
the land of my father, and America the land of my birth."
To have deserted the German people would have been an act of
treason agairist my conscience. Thus on December 8,1941,1 was
suddenly confronted with the choice of committing a possible act
of treason against my native America, or of deserting the German
people in their hour of need. If I had taken the easy way out, I
could have ceased my broadcasting activities with the excuse that
as an American I should not be expected any longer to plead the
cause of a country with which America was at war. . . . It was
not easy to tum my back perhaps forever on my friends in the
United States, never to see the land of my birth again. I made
then my choice, and I have never regretted that choice for an
instant. Not even now.
In closing, Kaltenbach refused to make "apologies for doing my
allotted bit to help the German people to a better future." "I am
not an enemy of the American people," he reiterated, "but I
shall remain an impossible enemy of those forces in America
who wish to deny Germany her rightful place in the European
Sim." He closed by using Patrick Henry's words: "If that be
treason, make the most of it."*'
IN THE MONTHS following Kaltenbach's indictinent, as the
Nazis recognized that Kaltenbach's propaganda, and that of the
other radio traitors, had no discernable effect on the Allied war
effort, the frequency of his radio broadcasts diminished. A few
of the American broadcasters were pulled from the air as com-
plete failures or for being counterproductive, but Kaltenbach
could still be heard in North America and by GIs in the field
between 1943 and early 1945.^ ° His tired Nazi propaganda slo-
49. Shirer, "Annerican Radio Traitors," 404. See also Case Report, Frederick
Wilhelm Kaltenbach, 18 April 1945, FBI File 65-6568-171. For a transcript of
Kaltenbach's 30 luly 1943 broadcast, see FBI File 65-6568-201.
50. Propagandist lane Anderson was pulled from the air in 1943 as being
completely ineffective. See Conyers-Read COI/OSS History, pp. 50-51, box
72, record group 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, National
Archives.
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gans and themes, however, were out of touch with reality and
were received with laughter, derision, and only passing curiosi-
ty. As Germany neared defeat, Kaltenbach's shrill denunciations
of Allied leaders and his patently false claims of Nazi victories
were ludicrous to even the lowest-ranking GIs, who saw evi-
dence to the contrary every day. The only groups who still paid
close attention to Kaltenbach were those few radio monitors and
FBI agents seeking further evidence to use against him.
Kaltenbach's health declined precipitously during the last
eighteen months of the war as he began to suffer from heart
problems and asthma. He also grew critical of Hitler and the
Nazis, often refusing to broadcast and going on strike, some-
times for months at a time. His attitudes and opinions alienated
his fellow collaborators and resulted in confrontations with
many, most notably with Lord Haw-Haw, who did not share
Kaltenbach's pessimism. According to Dorothea Kaltenbach, the
disputes between Lord Hee-Haw and Lord Haw-Haw became
so acrimonious that she feared William Joyce "would liked to
have killed my husband." Frau Kaltenbach later told U.S. Army
officials that her husband's work for the Nazis never produced
any riches or rewards, and that, like most collaborators, they
were considered outsiders of doubtful loyalty and were always
held at arm's length. Kaltenbach was never a Nazi, his wife later
claimed, and he supposedly "hated Hitler," making "broadcasts
only in the hope of keeping the U.S. out of the war." As the
Allies closed in, Kaltenbach, like many Nazis, attempted to
curry favor with anti-Nazi elements and "actively befriended
the . . . religious elements associated with Reverend [Martin]
NiemoUer," all to no avail.^ ^
Little is known of Kaltenbach's activities during the final
months of the war or during the fall of Berlin in April 1945.
On May 15,1945, however, just as U.S. Army CIC officers were
going to Kaltenbach's Berlin residence to place him under arrest,
he was taken into custody by Soviet agents who had accompa-
nied Russian troops into the city. Kaltenbach had attempted to
51. Quotes from Washington Post, 10 July 1945. See also Washington Star, 12
July 1945; Stars and Stripes, London edition, 10 September 1945; and Washington
Times-Herald, 21 July 1946.
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use his American citizenship to avoid arrest by hanging a large
sign bearing the word Americansky on his apartment door.^ ^
Kaltenbach's fate was soon caught up in the growing ten-
sions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Acting on information
provided by his wife, U.S. Army officials attempted to contact
Soviet authorities to seek his apprehension. But months went
by before official contact was made with the Soviets. Then the
Soviets denied they held Kaltenbach. The army and FBI were
certain, however, that Kaltenbach was in Soviet custody. In
August 1945 the Americans learned that Kaltenbach was in a
detention camp at Frankfurt-on-Oder, but attempts by the U.S.
Army to arrange a trade for two SS officers failed because the
Soviets denied they held Kaltenbach. By early September 1945,
army investigators traced Kaltenbach to two other camps with-
out catching up with him. In early October 1945 Soviet officials
informed the army yet again that "they do not have Kaltenbach
in custody, which means that the matter is officially closed."^^
In March 1946, however, the army received word from
repatriated FOWs that Lord Hee-Haw was in Soviet custody
near Weimar. Because the Soviets still insisted that they did not
have him, both army officials and Kaltenbach's wife, now living
in the American Zone of Berlin and working for the U.S. Army
as a translator, doubted he would ever be found. His wife, who
had heard from Kaltenbach only once since his arrest, feared
that his ill health would result in his death in captivity. Al-
though the Americans again requested Kaltenbach's release,
Soviet agents ignored them, causing one officer to report that
the army had "practically given up hope."^
A break in the case occurred in June 1946, when the Soviets
suddenly admitted having Kaltenbach and promised to release
him within a week to ten days. Yet when the deadline had ex-
52. Washington Post, 10 July 1945. See also Daily Worker, 10 July 1945. The date
of Kaltenbach's arrest was later inexplicably changed in newspaper reports
to 14 June and then to 14 July 1945.
53. Letter, [name deleted] to Director, FBI, 10 August 1945, FBI File 65-6568-
211; Washington Times-Herald, 21 July 1946. See also Stars and Stripes, London
edition, 10 September 1945; Letter, [name deleted] to Hoover, 11 October 1945,
FBI File 65-6568-217; and Edwards, Berlin Calling, 15.
54. Stars and Stripes, 10 March and 17 May 1946.
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pired, a Red Army major general notified U.S. Army headquar-
ters in Germany that after a long investigation it was discovered
that Frederick W. Kaltenbach had died of natural causes in
October 1945 somewhere in the Soviet Zone. Army officials
insisted on seeing camp records and a death certificate to con-
firm both the time and cause of death, but the Soviets respond-
ed that no such records existed and that the location of Kalten-
bach's remains were imknown. Frau Kaltenbach refused to
believe the Soviets until she saw the body herself or heard a
report of her husband's death from someone she knew. The U.S.
Army continued to request records, but nothing more came
from behind the Iron Curtain.^^
Back in the United States, the Justice Department still had
an outstanding indictment and was hesitant to accept Soviet
reports of Kaltenbach's death. Instead, in September 1946, the
department notified intelligence officials in France and Germany
to remain on the lookout for Kaltenbach among repatriated
POWs returning from the Soviet Zone. During the following two
years, however, no sign of Kaltenbach emerged. Finally, army
officials concluded that Kaltenbach had indeed died in Soviet
captivity and that "more definite" details would probably never
be available. When the State Department agreed with the army's
assessment and suggested that Kaltenbach's case be closed, tiie
FBI complied, and the U.S. District Court dismissed the indict-
ment against Kaltenbach on April 13,
AS A NAZI PROPAGANDIST, Frederick Kaltenbach was an
abject failure. His work for the Nazis did little to dissuade
Americans from supporting the war effort, and he accomplished
little unique during his life other than earrüng himself a place
among the small numbers of Americans who betrayed their
55. Washington Post, 21 July 1946. See also Washington Star, 21 July 1946.
56. Quote from Telegram, Horton R. Telford, Legal Attaché, U.S. State Depart-
ment, Paris, to Director FBI, 29 December 1947, FBI File 65-6568-237. See also
Telegram, FBI to Attaché, Paris, 12 September 1946, FBI File 65-6568-226;
Memo, [name deleted] to Director, FBI, 27 September 1947, FBI File 65-6568-
232; Memo, [name deleted] to Director, FBI, 3 November 1948, FBI File 65-
6568-241; and Memo, [name deleted] to Director, FBI, 28 June 1950, FBI Files
65-6568-243.
Frederick Kaltenbach and Nazi Radio Broadcasts 245
country during wartime. Urüike Benedict Arnold or even his
contemporary, the poet-tumed-propagandist Ezra Poimd, how-
ever, Kaltenbach is largely forgotten by history.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Kaltenbach's story
is that it reveals how one seeníüngly rational and intelligent.
American grasped fascism as the answer to the real and per-
ceived ills of western civilization during the interwar years. In
this, his reaction to the turmoil of the times was not unlike that
of many other Americans and Europeans, people who in most
respects were t)^ical citizens of normal means, circumstances,
and backgrounds. Kaltenbach sincerely believed in the false
promises of Nazism and felt that his work was a true sign of
German and American patriotism. While millions shared Kalten-
bach's beliefs and philosophies, only a few chose to take those
beliefs to the extreme of committing treason in the attempt to
make a new world according to the designs of Adolf Hitler and
National Socialism.
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